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Abstract Environmental risk management consists of
making decisions on human activities or construction
designs that are affected by the environment and/or have
consequences or impacts on it. In these cases, decisions are
made such that risk is minimized. In this regard, the
forthcoming paper develops a close form that relates risk
with cost, hazard, and vulnerability; and then focuses on
vulnerability. The vulnerability of a system under an
external action can be described by the conditional prob-
ability of the degrees of damage after an event. This vul-
nerability model can be obtained by a simplicial regression
of those outputs, as a response variable, on explanatory
variables. After a theoretical explanation, the authors pre-
sent the case study of a nuclear power plant containment
building. Once a given overpressure is registered inside the
containment building, three possible outputs are to be
considered: serviceability, breakdown, and collapse. The
study consists of three steps: (a) modelling the containment
building using the finite element method; (b) given an
overpressure, simulating uncertain parameters related to
material constitutive equations in order to obtain the cor-
responding proportions; (c) performing a simplicial
regression to obtain a meaningful vulnerability model. The
simulation provides normalized-to-unity outputs under the
overpressure conditions. The obtained vulnerability model
is in definite correspondence with previous results in
nuclear power plant safety analysis reports.
Keywords Vulnerability  Compositional data  Risk 
Hazard  Probabilistic safety assessment  Finite elements 
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1 Introduction
Environmental risk management consists of making deci-
sions on human activities or construction designs as they
are affected by the environment and/or they have conse-
quences or impacts on it. There are many different sce-
narios that can be described in these terms. Herein attention
is focused on cases where the relevant decision to be made
is a level of safety design: decide which level of safety has
to be achieved in a civil work in order to minimize the risk
associated with external actions of a given kind, possibly of
natural origen but not exclusively. This kind of decision
making can be treated using a prior decision tree (Benjamin
and Cornell 1981). Prior decision trees consist of three
elements: (a) the possible levels of safety design; (b) the
random states of the system which are susceptible to cause
effects and the description of their occurrence probabilities;
and (c) the generalized costs (or utilities) generated by the
realization of the random state and the design decision
made. Random states are related to the response of the
system to (random) external events.
The following examples are illustrative of the generality
of this scheme.
A. Floods caused by precipitation Important precipita-
tion in the catchment of a river may be the cause of a flood
in the lower end of the catchment or drainage point. A
system of small dams and channels is to be designed in
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these cases in order to regulate the draining of the catch-
ment, hence avoiding severe flooding. One solution may be
to take advantage of the water storing and dispersion
capacity of dams and channels in order to avoid too high
levels of the water in the riverbed. The random state is
related to the water level attained at the drainage point. For
this scenario, costs due to the safety design are mainly
related to the construction of the system of dams and
channels, and to the damage caused by floods during the
lifetime of the system. On the one hand, investment in a
high-safety level may be costly and may possibly produce a
considerable impact on the environment. Nonetheless,
floods might be controlled and their cost might become
negligible. On the other hand, a low environmental impact
of the construction, namely at a lower cost, may result in
high expenses associated with flooding.
B. Breakwater protecting a harbor Port activities in a
harbor have to be protected from ocean waves associated
with wave storms. Therefore, characteristics of the break-
water (geometry, resistance, protection effectiveness) have
to be decided. Random states are damages of the break-
water under storms occurring during the lifetime of the
breakwater and the effects of these events on the port
activities. Costs derive from the construction of the
breakwater and its visual and environmental impacts, as
well as from damages and interruption of the port services.
Certainly, high level of protection may lead to large con-
struction costs and severe environmental impacts; however,
it may protect port activity from disasters. The reverse
might attenuate construction costs and environmental
impact to the price of accidents, damages, and interruption
of port services.
C. Safety of a nuclear power plant containment buildingA
nuclear power plant might be involved in accidents which
cause overpressures in the interior of the containment
building. A containment failure may cause the release of
radioactive materials, which would heavily affect the envi-
ronment, human beings, and facilities in the surrounding
areas of the plant. Containment capabilities of the building
need hence to be decided. The random state to be taken into
account is the release of radioactive materials under over-
pressure events. Indeed, the construction of a very safe
containment building, in order to avoid any consequences to
the environment and population, may require a very signifi-
cant investment. In contrast, a weak containment building
may be relatively cheap; nevertheless, in case of core melt-
down or other kinds of accident, the release of radioactive
material may be a human and environmental disaster.
These three scenarios have some features in common.
Indeed, there are events that occur at a precise instant of
time and that can potentially cause costly damages or
impacts. In scenario A, these events are heavy precipitation
episodes; in scenario B, this role is played by wave storms;
whereas in case C the events are accidental overpressure
sequences in the containment building, which are not of
environmental origin but artificial. From now on, we call
these external events, as they are not intrinsic to the system
to be designed (system of dams and channels in A; break-
water in B; containment building in C). The random states
are then a combination of the (random) external actions
with the (random) response of the system. The response of
the system to the external actions determines the random
state, which is the final output. In the sketched cases, the
system outputs, as a response to external events, are: level
of water at drainage point in case A; level of damage in the
breakwater and interruptions of port activity in B; released
radioactive materials and its consequences in C.
In these three cases, external events are considered as
occurring at a precise instant of time. Frequently, the interest
is not the effect of a single event, but a sequence of them in
time, possibly during the lifetime of the system. In these
cases, the random state of the system should be modelled as
the number of system responses of different kind or mag-
nitude during the lifetime. For instance, in case A, for a
lifetime of 100 years, the random state of the system can be
defined as the number of times that: a precipitation event
causes no flood at drainage point; the number of times in
which a moderate flood occurs; the number of times in
which a severe flood is the result of a precipitation event.
Decision making in the safety design level commonly
consists of selecting the decision whose associated risk is
the least. Nonetheless, a variety of definitions of risk have
been used over the years. A common one is that risk,
associated with a given safety design D, is the expectation
of the cost associated with D and the random state of the
system, denoted as N herein. As N is considered random,
the cost C(N, D) is also random, and the expectation
RðDÞ ¼ ECðN;DÞjD, conditional to D, is taken as the
definition of the risk associated with D. As this expectation
is based on the probability distribution of the random states
of the system, the modelling of N and its distribution
becomes a primary goal in most risk analyses. However,
this task may be involved if no further simplifications are
adopted. A very effective assumption is to consider that,
conditional to D, pairs of external events and system
responses are conditionally independent, and they can thus
be modelled separately. On the one hand, the process
governing the external events can be studied from the
available knowledge and observations; on the other hand,
the random responses of the system to a given external
action can be examined by a simulation and the available
structural knowledge. Firstly, the probabilistic modelling
of external events is typically the goal of a hazard analysis,
which provides occurrence probabilities of the external
events. Secondly, the study of responses under given
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external actions can be named as a vulnerability assess-
ment, whose goal is to provide the probabilities of random
system responses under a given external action. Therefore,
not only does vulnerability take its place in the risk anal-
ysis, but it also has a role by its own. Vulnerability, as a
function of a nominal design parameter, provides detailed
information about the meaning of this parameter.
Regarding this whole process, Sect. 2 gives motivating
details of vulnerability modelling in a simple risk scenario.
Section 3 is divided into three subsections. Section 3.1
provides a definition and examples to understand vulnera-
bility, Sect. 3.2 proposes a procedure to estimate vulnera-
bility from the simulations of a deterministic model of the
system, and Sect. 3.3 describes statistical techniques to
properly treat the compositional nature of the data. Sec-
tion 4 presents a case study: the vulnerability of a nuclear
power plant containment building. This section is also
divided into several subsections, presenting the structural
characterization and numerical modelling (Sects. 4.1 and
4.2), random parameters involved (Sect. 4.3), and simula-
tion methods (Sects. 4.4 and 4.5). Results of the vulnera-
bility model corresponding to the case study are presented
in Sect. 4.7. Overall, the present work is made as a com-
bination of several pieces: Marked Poisson Processes as
modeling events on time, decision making, simplicial
regression, importance resampling, finite element method,
and a vulnerability model. All these pieces are well known
but, apparently, they have not been combined before.
2 Vulnerability in a simple scenario of risk
analysis
Assume that a system, characterized by its design D, is
under the effects of punctual external actions, generically
called events, at times tj. Each event has a random mag-
nitude Xj. As a result, the system produces random
responses according to such external actions. A simple, but
frequent model for such events is an homogeneous Poisson
process, with the parameter k accounting for the mean
number of events per unit time. These Poisson processes,
with magnitudes associated with events, are often called
marked Poisson processes. This simple scenario is com-
pleted with assumptions on the independence of the mag-
nitudes from occurrence times, and equal distribution of the
magnitude from event to event, i.e. fX is the common
probability density function for all the magnitudes Xj
associated with the events at times tj (Embrechts et al.
1997). However, interest is focused on the system
responses to such events. For practical applications, one
assumes that these possible responses are classified into
categories of response, hi; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; I, possibly including
a case in which the system is not altered by the external
action. Assuming again that random responses hi are
independent from event to event, the process of time events
and responses also constitutes a marked Poisson process
(also known as a compound Poisson process). The occur-
rence of each kind of response hi can be proven to be a
Poisson process with parameter kP½H ¼ hijD, where H
denotes a categorical random variable whose outputs are
the hi’s. Moreover, for different kind of responses, these
Poisson processes are independent. Denoting by Ni the
random number of responses hi in a lifetime L, the prob-
abilities can be computed as
P

Ni ¼ nijL;D

¼

kP½H ¼ hijD L
ni
exp
 kP½H ¼ hijD L

ni!
;
ð1Þ
for ni ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . and i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; I. These characterize
the process of the responses and allow one to compute the
risk of a given design D once the costs of each response are
known. Assume that C0ðDÞ is the cost associated with the
construction of the system and associated impacts; and
CiðDÞ, the costs associated with each response of the sys-
tem. In a first approach, the total cost of a given design
during its lifetime L is
CðN;DÞ ¼ C0ðDÞ þ
XI
i¼1
NiCiðDÞ;
where N ¼ ðN1;N2; . . .;NIÞ contains the random number of
times each response hi occurs during the lifetime L. This
expression is linear in Ni, but could be thought in other
ways, for instance, adding quadratic terms in Ni. The risk is
computed by taking the expectation of C(N, D) according
to the distribution of the Ni’s in Eq. (1), which yields
RðDÞ ¼ ECðN;DÞjD ¼ C0ðDÞ þ
XI
i¼1
CiðDÞL kP½H
¼ hijD: ð2Þ
This expression reveals that P½H ¼ hijD is a fundamental
piece of the risk R(D). The randomness of H comes both
from the occurrences of external events and from the ran-
dom response of the system. This feature can be made
explicit using the total probability theorem
P½H ¼ hijD ¼
Z
P½H ¼ hijx;D  fXðxÞ dx ; fXðxjDÞ
¼ fXðxÞ; ð3Þ
where the latter expression corresponds to the assumption
of independence between the system design and the
magnitude of the event. Substituting Eq. (3) in (2), the
risk is
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RðDÞ ¼ C0ðDÞ þ
XI
i¼1
CiðDÞ
Z
P½H ¼ hijx;D|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
vulnerability
kLfXðxÞ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
hazard
dx:
ð4Þ
Here, the three elements of a priori decision tree: safety
design, random states, and costs appear altogether. The
random states are the different values of the vector
N ¼ ðN1;N2; . . .;NIÞ, denoting the number of times that
each response hi appear in the lifetime L. However, the
main feature of Eq. (4) is that the characteristics of the
process of external actions, represented by k and fX , and the
vulnerability model, P½H ¼ hijx;D, appear separately.
This fact suggests the separate modelling of the two
functions. On the one hand, a hazard assessment procedure
can account for k and fX; and, on the other hand, a vul-
nerability analysis can be used to construct a vulnerability
model from the structural characteristics of the system
implied by D.
In more complex scenarios, where independence of
external events and their magnitudes, or the homogeneous
Poisson process, cannot be assumed, expression (4) turns
out to be more involved, but still the model of vulnera-
bility, represented by P½H ¼ hijx;D, is of primary interest.
As a summary of the definitions described in this sec-
tion, flowchart in Fig. 1 contains a schematic representation
of the relation between hazard, vulnerability, and costs.
3 Vulnerability model
3.1 Definition of vulnerability
As motivated in the previous Sect. 2, vulnerability of a
system under external actions of magnitude x, can be
described by the probabilities
P½H ¼ hijx;D; i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; I; ð5Þ
for any magnitude x of the external events. This set of
conditional probabilities is called vulnerability model or
vulnerability for short.
In order to statistically model such probabilities as a
function of the design D and the magnitude of the event x, a
probabilistic model of the random state H is needed. Very
often a deterministic model of responses is available but it
does not account for uncertainty of H. The randomness of
H comes from the fact that both the design D and the
magnitude of external actions x do not define a complete
set of conditions in which the deterministic model of
response is applied. This means that both D and x are
nominal descriptions of the design and the external action,
and the whole set of parameters to feed the deterministic
model of responses are distributed conditional to D and
x. This joint distribution is a key to proceed by Monte
Carlo methods: once D, x are fixed, a simulated sample of
the whole set of required parameters is computed and,
subsequently, the resulting sample response. This provides
a sample of responses from which the probabilities of the
vulnerability (5) can be estimated.
3.2 Estimation of parameters
Given the nominal parameters of D and x, repeated simu-
lations of the action characteristics and full parametric
description of the system are required. For each simulated
parameters of the action and system, the deterministic
model predicts a response hi. A typical situation is to select
values of the nominal design D. Let Dk, k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n be
these sampling points. Then, values of the magnitude of the
external actions xj, j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; nx are also selected. For
each Dk and xj, one should simulate all the necessary
parameters to feed the available model of the system, and
hence compute the predicted response hðk;j;sÞ, considered
within the hi’s, with s indicating the simulation. The
selection of the sampling points can be designed in several
Fig. 1 Summary flowchart with the relation between hazard,
vulnerability, and costs. For each possible design or decision D, a
random state N represents the number of responses of the system in
each (random) category H ¼ hi. Hazard consists of probabilistic
description of N, and vulnerability describes the probability of
response hi given an external action. Costs correspond to each design
and the actual number of responses along the lifetime
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ways, but in many situations repeated simulations for the
same Dk and xj is convenient: changes in the characteristics
of the system Dk or xj are frequently time consuming and of
high computational cost.
Applying this simulation scheme, the data obtained, for
instance for D1, are
This block is repeated for D2, D3,..., Dn. Note that a
common value of nk;j is on the order of 10
4, 105, or larger.
The number of studied designs, n, and of the levels of
action, nx, ought to be somewhere between 2 and 50 in
simplified scenarios. Then, the analyst is confronted with a
data set of about a million or more terns ðDk; xj; hÞ. This
data set should be used to fit a vulnerability model which
predicts P½H ¼ hijD; x for any design D and magnitude of
the action x. Multinomial logistic regression provides this
type of model. However, multinomial logistic regression
relies on maximum likelihood estimation of parameters,
which requires some sort of iterative procedure. Given the
large sample size of the data set, the convergence of the
iterative procedures can be problematic, specially if the
chosen sampling design results in an unbalanced data set.
It seems preferable to summarize the data set into pro-
portions of responses obtained for each sampling point
ðDk; xjÞ. This is the approach adopted here. Let these pro-
portions be pðk;jÞ ¼ ðpðk;jÞ1 ; pðk;jÞ2 ; . . .; pðk;jÞI Þ. Now, the data
set is reduced to n nx data points corresponding to the
design Dk, the magnitude of the action xj, and I proportions
in pðk;jÞ, whose components add to one. This kind of data
corresponds to a regression in the simplex: the variables to
be predicted are the probabilities pi ¼ P½H ¼ hijD; x,
i ¼ 1; 2; . . .; I, which have been observed as pðk;jÞ, which, in
turn, are the I-part compositions (Egozcue et al. 2012;
Pawlowsky-Glahn et al. 2015). The explanatory variables
in the regression are the design level Dk and the value of
the nominal external actions xj or transformations of them.
3.3 Treatment of proportions as compositional data
Assuming that Dk, xj are given in an absolute scale, the
simplest predictor of the probabilities in the vulnerability
model (5) is a linear combination of Dk, xj. This predictor
can be enriched with other functions of Dk, xj. Such a
predictor would provide real linear predictions, however
pðk;jÞ is a vector located in the I-part simplex, i.e. its
components add to one, and its scale is doubtfully thought
as being absolute. In fact, the vector of probabilities should
be scale invariant. For instance, if multiplied by 100
(percentage probabilities) or any other positive constant,
the information provided must remain invariant [e.g.
(Aitchison 1986; Egozcue 2009; Pawlowsky-Glahn et al.
2015)]. The I components of the vectors of probabilities
can be represented in the I-part simplex SI . This structure
contains all vectors of positive I components adding to 1.
Indeed, the SI can be structured as an Euclidean space
(Pawlowsky-Glahn and Egozcue 2001). Consequently,
Cartesian coordinates are available in this space. Isometric
logratio transformations (ilr) provide such coordinates
(Egozcue et al. 2003). Some of the ilr’s assign inter-
pretable and easy-to-use coordinates, called balances.
These are constructed using sequential binary partitions
(SBP) of the composition components (Egozcue and
Pawlowsky-Glahn 2005). An example of this kind of bal-
ance-coordinates is shown in the case study in Sect. 4.6.
The ilr transformation represents the composition p by
means of a real coordinate vector of I  1 components,
ilrðpÞ. This vector of coordinates can be predicted by using
linear combinations of Dk and xj with no further problem.
The multivariate regression model can be expressed as
ilr

pðk;jÞ
 ¼ b0 þ Dkb1 þ xjb2 þ k;j;
k ¼ 1; 2; . . .; n; j ¼ 1; 2; . . .; nx;
ð6Þ
where b0, b

1, b

2 are real vectors of I  1 components
containing regression coefficients, and k;j are the residuals
for the observation (k, j). Once the regression model (6) is
fitted, the predicted probabilities can be obtained using the
inverse ilr-transformation. These models have been studied
in the last decade [e.g. (Egozcue et al. 2012; Tolosana-
Delgado and van den Boogaart 2011; Tolosana-Delgado
and von Eynatten 2009)], although regression in the sim-
plex was first introduced by Aitchison and Shen (1980).
The regression model in Eq. (6) is proposed herein as
one of the simplest models to be able to capture the main
features of vulnerability. This model has the advantage that
ðD1 x1 hð1;1;1Þ Þ ðD1 x1 hð1;1;2Þ Þ :::,
ðD1 x2 hð1;2;1Þ Þ ðD1 x2 hð1;2;2Þ Þ :::,
::: ::: ::: ::: ::: ::: :::,
ðD1 xnx hð1;nx;1Þ Þ ðD1 xnx hð1;nx;2Þ Þ :::,
ðD1 x1 hð1;1;n1;1Þ Þ
ðD1 x2 hð1;2;n1;2Þ Þ
::: ::: :::
ðD1 xnx hð1;nx;n1;nxÞ Þ
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it can be fitted using least squares techniques. Additionally,
modifications on these least square techniques can be easily
adopted.
4 Case study: a nuclear power plant containment
building
Nuclear power plant safety is of general concern due to
the consequences of nuclear accidents. Consequently, the
risk assessment of these facilities, old and new, is of
upmost importance both for technical and social reasons
(International Atomic Energy Agency 2001). Nuclear
power plants are very complex systems and their detailed
study requires a decomposition into subsystems (U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission 2007). Each subsystem
is then modelled by considering the interactions with
other parts of the plant. The present study concerns to a
particular subsystem: the containment building of the
nuclear power plant subjected to a possible overpressure
event in its interior (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
2010). The containment is normally thought as the fourth
and final barrier to the release of radioactive materials,
after the fuel pellets, the fuel cladding, and the reactor
pressure boundary.
The goal of this study is to estimate a vulnerability
model of the containment building, whose design D is
given, under the external action of an overpressure, deno-
ted x, as in previous sections. A first step is to build up a
numerical model that, given an overpressure x and given
the design D and derived parameters, is able to predict the
response of the containment building (Sect. 4.1). Next Sect.
4.3 describes the treatment of the parameters of the con-
tainment building to set up the complete input of the
numerical model. Section 4.4 defines the responses hi of
the containment building for this case study. Section 4.5
contains a detailed explanation of used simulation tech-
niques. Section 4.6 makes the simplicial regression tech-
nique and the particular system of ilr coordinates used
explicit. Results are shown in Sect. 4.7.
Significant experimental research on this matter was
performed at Sandia National Laboratories (USA) during
the beginning of the 2000’s. This research can be consulted
at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (2006).
4.1 Containment building characteristics
The containment building is designed to confine the
radioactive materials in case of an emergency, up to a
maximum gauge pressure in the range of 0.4–1.4 MPa
(Crusells-Girona 2011; U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commis-
sion 2015). From now on, the pressure will be defined as
relative (or gauge pressure): the absolute pressure minus
the atmospheric one (0.1 MPa). Containment systems for
nuclear power reactors are distinguished by size, shape,
material, and reactor coolant state. In this analysis, a three-
loop pressurized water reactor (PWR) is considered. For
this type of reactor, the containment also encloses the
steam generators, the pressurizer, and the entire reactor
coolant system. Early designs by Siemens, Westinghouse,
and Combustion Engineering Crusells-Girona (2011) have
a can-like shape built with reinforced or prestressed con-
crete. One of the most used designs is a can-like shell
covered with a half-spherical dome, whose main advantage
is that it reduces joint stresses by continuity of the shell. In
this case, the structure considered will be a prestressed
cylindrical building with a half-spherical dome. Examples
of this particular model can be found on North Anna
Nuclear Power Plant (VA, USA), Wolf Creek Nuclear
Power Plant (KS, USA), Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power
Plant (CA, USA) or Vandello´s II Nuclear Power Plant
(Spain). The most important dimensions of the building are
shown in Table 1 and in Fig. 2.
4.2 Numerical model
As mentioned in Sect. 3.1, the estimation of a vulnerability
model is based on the availability of a deterministic model
of the system, once the design D and derived parameters
are given and the external action is fixed.
According to the drawings (Fig. 2), it is possible to
create a geometrical model (Fig. 3) in a finite element
software such as Abaqusr.
Additionally, parameters regarding the material proper-
ties are required by the model. The most important
parameters of the building materials are shown in Table 2.
These properties feed the constitutive model considered.
Herein, the concrete damage plasticity (CDP) model is
used, taking advantage that it is already available in Aba-
qus Hibbitt and Sorensen (2002). The CDP model is a
continuum, plasticity-based damage model for concrete. It
defines two failure mechanisms: tensile cracking and
compressive crushing of the concrete material. The evo-
lution of the yield surface is controlled by two hardening
Table 1 Most important dimensions of the building
Dimension Value
Inner diameter (m) 40.00
Total inner height (m) 63.40
Cylinder inner height (m) 43.40
Foundation thickness (m) 3.00
Cylinder thickness (m) 1.15
Dome thickness at the top (m) 0.95
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variables, and linked to failure criteria under tension and
compression loading, respectively. The CDP model uses a
constitutive equation with a scalar isotropic damage
parameter in the following form
r ¼ ð1 dÞDel0 : ð plÞ ¼ Del : ð plÞ; r ¼ ð1 dÞr;
ð7Þ
where r corresponds to the stress tensor, d is the scalar
stiffness degradation parameter (or damage parameter), 
stands for the strain tensor, pl is the plastic strain tensor
and Del0 corresponds to the undamaged elastic stiffness.
Moreover, the damage parameter d is a function of the
stress and the plastic strain tensors.
d ¼ dðr; plÞ; ð8Þ
where pl represents the undamaged plastic strain tensor
corresponding to the hardening and/or softening behavior.
It is worth mentioning that, when materials exhibit
strain-softening behavior, the classical stress–strain for-
mulation of continuum mechanics results in a strong mesh
dependency (dissipated energy increases upon mesh
refinement). In order to attack this undesired effect, the
authors make use of the intrinsic capabilities of Abaqus,
which are intended to alleviate this problem, without any
further implementation. The strategy followed by the code
is to introduce a characteristic length into the formulation,
Fig. 2 Drawing of the building (Cervera et al. 1995)
Fig. 3 Geometrical finite element model developed by the authors.
Top and Bottom views
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which is related to the element size and is treated as an
inner parameter, and to express the softening part of the
behavior in a stress–displacement manner. Therefore, the
energy dissipated per unit area can be easily adjusted (area
under the curve), and is used to determine the displacement
at which full damage occurs. It is interesting to note that
this is essentially the technique used in fracture mechanics.
As a result, this procedure ensures that the correct energy is
dissipated and thus alleviates the mesh dependency, mak-
ing the model more robust.
Beside the uniaxial tensile and compressive behavior,
the inputs required in order to completely define the CDP
model are five parameters (Table 3). These parameters
define the shape of the yield surface and the flow rule (in
terms of a flow potential G). The yield condition is
described in detail in Lubliner et al. (1989). On the other
hand, for the flow potential, the model uses the Drucker-
Prager hyperbolic function. Taking fc and ft as the uniaxial
tensile and compressive strengths of concrete, b as the
dilation angle and m as the eccentricity of the plastic
potential surface; the flow potential ðGÞ in the p-q plane is
G ¼
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ðfc  mft tan bÞ2 þ q2
q
 p tan b r: ð9Þ
In this equation, p and q are the hydrostatic and deviatoric
components, respectively.
The parameters of the model are taken from Jankowiak
and Lodygowski (2013) and are shown in Table 3.
Finally, the last step is to define the softening and
hardening rules. The first one is related to the concrete
tensile behavior whereas the second one regards its com-
pressive behavior.
Jankowiak and Lodygowski (2013) consider the mate-
rial as massive concrete. Nonetheless, the containment
building under study has, besides the prestressing cables, a
high density of rebars. Even though there are different
densities of rebars throughout the structure, this amount has
been considered constant and assigned a value of 0.035
steal/concrete rate in volume. In this case, if the rebars are
oriented properly in the direction of the expected stress, a
0.035 steal/concrete ratio is to be expected on average in
any transversal cut of the building according to the draw-
ings. Taking this into account, the behavior of the rein-
forced concrete can be approximated as the sum of the
contributions of the concrete and the rebars. Figure 4
illustrates the composition to obtain the tensile constitutive
model of the reinforced concrete.
The compression constitutive model has been obtained
by taking into account only the concrete contribution.
Indeed, the rebars do not add any significant resistance at
the utilized pressures. Furthermore, it has to be noticed
that, in this study, the compressive behavior is not of
significant relevance: the external load is an inner pres-
sure; thus it will produce an expansion of the cylinder
and, therefore, a failure through the concrete tensile
behavior.
Fig. 4 Tensile constitutive behavior of the reinforced concrete
Table 2 Most important material properties
Concrete parameters Value
Elastic modulus (GPa) 30
Ultimate compressive strength (MPa) 39
Ultimate tensile strength (MPa) 3
Density (kN/m3) 25
Poisson ratio () 0.2
Rebar parameters Value
Elastic modulus (GPa) 220
Yield strength (MPa) 470
Ultimate strength (MPa) 610
Prestressing tendon parameters Value
80 Prestressing force of vertical tendons (kN) 4700
110 Prestressing force of horizontal tendons (kN) 5400
22 Prestressing force of dome tendons (kN) 5500
Table 3 Summary of CDP
parameters
CDP parameters Value
b 38
m 1
fb0=fc 1.12
c 0.666
Viscosity 0.02
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Once all the above has been introduced, it is required to
apply the appropriate boundary conditions, which consist
of fixing the foundation. Finally, the last input is the
external load, which is an inner pressure. In order to
illustrate the behavior of the model, Fig. 5 shows the
(magnified) shape resulting of the deformation when the
building is faced up to an overpressure of 0.7 MPa: the
building becomes shorter and wider.
Themesh of the FEM is built using tetrahedral elements. In
particular, there are 9292 elements in the foundation, 25,307
elements in the cylinder, and 4392 elements in the dome.
4.3 Random parameters
One of the most common problems in Civil Engineering is
that material properties are usually uncertain. It is fairly
difficult to ascertain their values even with an extensive test
campaign. In order to capture this uncertainty in the
material properties, five variables have been taken as ran-
dom, and four other variables have been considered to
directly depend on the latter ones. Applying this direct
dependence, it is possible to account for some relations
between variables. The material, nonetheless, has been
considered uniform in the whole building. As a conse-
quence, the value of the material parameters is the same
everywhere for each computation.
The random parameters and their distribution are
described below:
1. Concrete elastic modulus ðEmÞ LogNormal distribu-
tion, E½Em ¼ 41; 100MPa, Var½Em ¼ 16; 892; 100
MPa2, i.e. logarithmic mean and variance are 6.0638
and 0.05743, respectively.
2. Steel yield strength ðfyÞ LogNormal distribution,
E½fy ¼ 430MPa, Var½fy ¼ 576MPa2, i.e. logarithmic
mean and variance are 6.0638 and 0.05743,
respectively.
3. Prestressing force of vertical cables Logistic-Normal
distribution on the interval (0, 610). The logistic
parameters have mean 1.30 and standard deviation
0.43. The median of this distribution is 610
expð1:30Þ
1þexpð1:30Þ
¼ 4790 kN.
4. Prestressing force of horizontal cables Logistic-Nor-
mal distribution on the interval (0, 610). The logistic
parameters have mean 2.22 and standard deviation
0.80. The median of this distribution is 610
expð2:22Þ
ð1þexpð2:22Þ
¼ 5500 kN.
5. Prestressing force of dome cables Logistic-Normal
distribution on the interval (0, 610). The logistic
parameters have mean 2.36 and standard deviation
0.71. The median of this distribution is 610
expð2:36Þ
1þexpð2:36Þ
¼ 5570 kN.
The parameters of the above-mentioned distributions have
been based on a data set from Aguado et al. (1991) and
Barbat et al. (1995).
The variables that have a direct dependence on the
random ones described above are:
1. Concrete ultimate compressive strength fc ¼ Em1550697 .
2. Concrete ultimate tensile strength ft ¼ 0:30ðfc  8Þ
2
3.
3. Steel elastic modulus Es ¼ fy0:00214.
4. Steel ultimate strength fu ¼ 55004200 fy.
These relations have been taken from Aguado et al. (1991).
Other parameters such as the density of the concrete or the
Fig. 5 Mesh of the finite
element model of the building
(left). Deformation caused by a
0.7 MPa inner pressure, only
elements near to the
penetrations of the building
have reached plasticity (marked
in red) (right)
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Poisson ratio have been considered as fixed values, since
their variance can be neglected.
Following the notation in Sect. 2, the parameters defined
in Sects. 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3 completely characterize the
design of the system D. Notice that vulnerability is studied
in only one particular design of the system, therefore, in
Sect. 3, n is 1, i.e. only k ¼ 1 case is studied.
4.4 Responses of containment building
In the present vulnerability study, the external action x is
identified as an overpressure inside the containment
building. Once a given overpressure is registered, three
possible responses are considered: serviceability, break-
down, and collapse (hi, i ¼ 1; 2; 3; respectively). As
defined in Sect. 2, these outputs or responses allow one to
compute the risk of a given design. In this particular case,
these responses are strongly related to the tensile consti-
tutive behavior obtained above. As a matter of fact, in order
to define in which final state the structure ends up being, a
failure criterion needs to be defined. For simplicity, the
largest attained value of the maximum principal tensile
strain (S11) is extracted in each computation. Two thresh-
olds in S11 define the three possible outputs. For S11 less
than 0.3 mm/m serviceability is assumed (h1). From S11
equals from 0.3 mm/m to 2 mm/m, the output is considered
as breakdown (h2). Finally, for S11 greater than 2 mm/m,
the output is considered as collapse (h3). The 0.3 mm/m
threshold typically indicates that concrete has already
cracked and the resistance is then controlled by the rebars.
The second one has been defined as 2 mm/m, which is the
threshold that indicates that the rebars have reached plas-
ticity. These thresholds clearly split the three possible final
scenarios. Serviceability is related to no damage in the
building because the concrete has not significantly cracked.
As a result, the nuclear power plant can continue its
operations without any concern about structural integrity.
In the case of breakdown, the building has been slightly
damaged because in some parts the concrete has started to
significantly crack. The nuclear power plant has therefore
to stop its activity and seal the cracks before restarting its
operations. Finally, in the case of collapse, the building is
massively damaged due to the fact that the rebars have
reached the plastic capacity. Therefore, the building will
have no chance to be fixed.
1. Serviceability (h1) S11 less than 0.3 mm/m. Normal
operation. No damage at all in the building.
2. Breakdown (h2) S11 equals from 0.3 mm/m to 2 mm/m.
Operations temporarily suspended, maintenance is
required. Concrete cracked, resistance controlled by
the rebars.
3. Collapse (h3) S11 greater than 2 mm/m. Structure
failure. Rebars reached the plastic capacity.
4.5 Simulation of random responses
Only one design D ¼ D1 is studied, however the subscript
is maintained to be consistent with notation in Sects. 3.1
and 4.5. Taking all the distributions of the random vari-
ables into account, the procedure to simulate the parame-
ters is reproduced as follows. First, the overpressure is
fixed to a certain value xj. Second, the five random
parameters, described in Sect. 4.3 are simulated as inde-
pendent random variables. Once the random parameters are
obtained, the directly dependent parameters, fc, ft, Es, fu,
are computed using the corresponding expressions (Sect.
4.3). Then, for the overpressure value xj and for each set of
simulated parameters qc, c ¼ 1; 2; . . .;C, the strains are
computed using the FEM. From the computed strains, the
output (serviceability, breakdown, and collapse) is deter-
mined in each simulation. In order to do that, a multinomial
random trial H is defined; its parameters are the proba-
bilities in the vulnerability model P½H ¼ hijxj;D1,
i ¼ 1; 2; 3. Any realization of H is a vector containing a
single 1 in one of the three components. The indexes refer
to serviceability (h1), breakdown (h2), and collapse (h3)
respectively. For instance, if the vector qc, which contains
the inputs in the computation, gives an output of collapse,
the realization of H will be: (0, 0, 1), which is denoted by
h3. Notice thatHðqcjxj;DÞ denotes a realization ofH as the
randomness of H only derives from qc which has been
obtained in the simulation c. Then, simulation of qc pro-
duces a sample from H.
The goal of simulation is to obtain (simulated) sample
values Hðqcjxj;DÞ, c ¼ 1; 2; . . .;C, and, then, use Monte
Carlo methods to estimate P½H ¼ hijxj;D1, i ¼ 1; 2; 3.
These probabilities are the expectation of H given the
overpressure xj and the design D1. They can be computed
using the Monte Carlo integration method
E½Hjxj;D1 ¼
Z
Hðqjxj;D1ÞfQðqÞdq  1
C
PC
c¼1Hðqcjxj;D1Þ¼ pð1;jÞ
where pð1;jÞ ¼ ðpð1;jÞ1 ; pð1;jÞ2 ; pð1;jÞ3 Þ and fQðqÞ denotes the
joint distribution of qs as defined in Sect. 4.3. Accordingly,
p
ð1;jÞ
1 , p
ð1;jÞ
2 , and p
ð1;jÞ
3 are obtained as the mere proportion of
times in which the simulation for xj results in serviceabil-
ity, breakdown, and collapse, respectively.
The main problem in this approach is that for any given
overpressure xj, some responses are very improbable,
producing zeros in the corresponding proportions. This is
the case, for instance, of p
ð1;jÞ
3 with xj ¼ 0:4 MPa. In this
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case, the overpressure is so low that it is fairly impossible
to obtain a simulation that ends up in collapse. In order to
reduce the presence of zero proportions, importance re-
sampling (Hammersley and Handscom 1964) is to be
applied in the simulation.
The procedure is the following, the sampling is done
in terms of a distribution, called sampling distribution
with density function gQ, which allows the desired
parameter values to be likely to appear in the simulation.
Then, the importance fQ=gQ is the rate of the model
probability density function over the sampling probability
density function. This importance ratio is stored in each
simulation and the Monte Carlo procedure is modified as
follows
E½Hjxj;D1 ¼
Z
Hðqjxj;D1ÞgQðqÞ fQðqÞ
gQðqÞ dq
 1
C
XC
c¼1
Hðqcjxj;D1Þ
fQðqcÞ
gQðqcÞ
¼ pð1;jÞ:
Table 4 illustrates the methodology to obtain the vector
pð1;jÞ.
As mentioned previously, qc includes all the inputs
required by the software in the c-th simulation. The output
is the final state of the building: serviceability, breakdown,
or collapse; and the importance is the ratio of the model
probability density function over the sampling probability
density function fQðqcÞ=gQðqcÞ. After C ¼ 2000, the value
of the three proportions of pð1;jÞ is obtained as a relative
frequency.
Since the re-sampling has been applied in the simulation
of all the combinations of inputs, the number of occur-
rences for each possible response has to be weighted by its
importance before performing the regression. Therefore,
the proportions of each component are computed in terms
of the sum of importances as derived from Eq. (10). The
lower part of Table 4 illustrates the procedure to obtain
these proportions.
4.6 Simplicial regression
Until now, the probabilities of each possible output (ser-
viceability, breakdown, and collapse) have been obtained
for a given overpressure xj. However, the vulnerability
model is pð1;jÞ, for any overpressure. The overpressure is
characterized by its value in MegaPascals (MPa) and, for
the sake of simplicity, it will be discretized in 13 values
from 0.40 to 1.00, with a step of 0.05 MPa; j ¼ 1; 2. . .13
respectively. Therefore, the data are described by the
probabilities of each three final states conditioned to each
of the 13 values of the internal pressure. Indeed, the
problem can be seen as a least squares fitting. The data to
be fitted are the compositional data points pð1;jÞ for
j ¼ 1; 2. . .13; each of them containing the probability of
each three final possible states conditioned to the corre-
sponding value of the overpressure. The explanatory vari-
able is the overpressure xj from 0.4 to 1.0 in MPa and, after
the least squares fitting, the approximated vulnerability
model pð1;jÞ will be obtained for any overpressure.
As discussed in Sect. 3, two problems are involved in this
approach: the consistencyof themodel and the relative scale of
the probability values. Since the vulnerability model is
described in terms of probabilities that must add up to one,
even small deviations in the estimation of a probability value
can result into an inconsistency of the model. Moreover,
probabilities are to be measured relatively, as they are not an
absolute value in the real line. These difficulties suggest
approaching the problembymeans of the simplex geometry of
D parts (Aitchison 1986; Pawlowsky-Glahn and Egozcue
2001; Egozcue et al. 2003), which allows one to interpolate
probability vectors in a consistent way and in an appropriate
scale. The elements in the simplex (SD) have D probability
components (in this case D ¼ 3); since all the components
must add up to one, the dimension is D 1. The simplex SD
endowed with two operations (, called perturbation and 	,
called powering) is proven to be a vector space. Perturbation
Table 4 Scheme of importance
re-sampling for C ¼ 2000 Simulated parameters Service. h1 Breakd. h2 Collapse h3 Import. ratio
q1 1.51 0 0 1.51
q2 4.21 0 0 4.21
q3 0 0 0.04 0.04
... ... ... ... ...
q2000 0 0.53 0 0.53
sum 1056.23 102.42 12.77 1171.42
pð1;jÞ 0.9017 0.0874 0.0109
Upper part of Table output data. Lower part of Table computation of pð1;jÞ
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plays the role of an addition and powering is a multiplication
by real scalars (Aitchison et al. 2002).Moreover,SD is aD 1
dimensionalEuclidean space (Pawlowsky-Glahn andEgozcue
2001) if its own distance is added. This distance is called
Aitchison distance, as it was first introduced by Aitchison
(1986). In this particular problem, the data that has to be fitted
are pð1;1Þ; pð1;2Þ. . .pð1;13Þ and, when treating the data as com-
positional, the linear predictor function in the simplexbecomes
p^ðxÞ ¼ b0  ðx	 b1Þ; ð10Þ
where  and 	 are perturbation and powering in the
simplex. The values of b0 and b1 are compositional
parameters to be fitted in the regression.
This linear fitting can be reduced to a D 1 standard
linear regression model, which can be solved by using least
squares techniques. The procedure consists of expressing
the composition p^ðxÞ into orthonormal coordinates using an
ilr transformation (Egozcue et al. 2003). In this case, the
operations  and 	 are reduced to the common þ and ,
respectively. Then, SD is considered equivalent to RD1 ,
where compositions are represented by orthonormal coor-
dinates. These facts allow transforming the p
ð1;jÞ
1 , p
ð1;jÞ
2 , and
p
ð1;jÞ
3 ; j ¼ 1; 2. . .13 proportions into balance-coordinates
b
ðjÞ
1 ; b
ðjÞ
2 ; j ¼ 1; 2. . .13. A regression of these bðjÞ1 and bðjÞ2 on
overpressure provides a linear vulnerability model in RD1
(Egozcue et al. 2012; Pawlowsky-Glahn et al. 2015).
An easy way to obtain orthonormal coordinates is by
producing a sequential binary partition (SBP) (Egozcue
and Pawlowsky-Glahn 2005). Table 5 shows the code of
such an SBP. In the first step, breakdown and collapse are
separated from serviceability as shown by the signs 1 and
1. The second and last step consists of separating
breakdown from collapse.
The balance-coordinates corresponding to the SBP
(Table 5) are
b
ðjÞ
1 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
3
r
log
p
ð1;jÞ
1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
p
ð1;jÞ
1 p
ð1;jÞ
3
q
0
B@
1
CA; bðjÞ2 ¼
ﬃﬃﬃ
1
2
r
log
p
ð1;jÞ
2
p
ð1;jÞ
3
 !
; j
¼ 1; 2. . .13
ð11Þ
Then, the data that has to be fitted with the regression
model are bð1Þ; bð2Þ. . .bð13Þ; where bðjÞ ¼ ðbðjÞ1 ; bðjÞ2 Þ; j ¼
1; 2. . .13 is a vector in RD1 (R2, in this case)
b^ðxÞ ¼ b0 þ ðx  b1Þ; ð12Þ
where b0 and b

1 are the coordinates of the previous b0 and
b1 in Eq. (10). Therefore, the vector expression in Eq. (12)
can be split into two pieces, one for each component,
b^1ðxÞ ¼ b0;1 þ ðx  b1;1Þ; b^2ðxÞ ¼ b0;2 þ ðx  b1;2Þ: ð13Þ
For each linear least squares fitting, the function that has to
be minimized is
SSE1 ¼
X13
j¼1
jb^1ðxjÞ  bðjÞ1 j2; SSE2 ¼
X13
j¼1
jb^2ðxjÞ  bðjÞ2 j2:
Finally, all of the above coordinates can be back-trans-
formed into the previous space (SD) by using ilr1, as an
easy interpretation. As a summary of the steps, flowchart in
Fig. 6 contains a schematic representation of the steps to
obtain a vulnerability model.
4.7 Results
As mentioned above, the probabilities of each response in
each overpressure event have been obtained via the pro-
portions of their occurrences in the simulation, in terms of
importance ratios. Table 6 shows the results obtained and
the number of simulations carried out.
Once the data above is computed, it is possible to obtain
the balances through the isometric-logratio transformation
(Eq. 11). However, balance-coordinates in Eq. (11) cannot
be computed when some frequencies are zero. It is
important to note that the importance re-sampling has
Fig. 6 Summary flowchart with the steps to obtain a vulnerability
model
Table 5 SBP code used to build up ilr balance-coordinates
Order Service. h1 Breakd. h2 Collapse h3
1 1 -1 1
2 0 1 1
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helped in eliminating those zero entries. Moreover, some
extreme data such as the value of b1 in the overpressure of
0.70 MPa and the value of b2 in the overpressure of
0.95 MPa will not be used in the linear regression. The
reason is that both come from data that is difficult to obtain
in the simulation, even applying the importance re-sam-
pling technique; and thus, they contain a considerable error
as their sample is not large enough. Should both points be
used, they would distort the linearity of the regression.
Table 7 and Fig. 7 show the results.
These ilr transformed data and their lineal regression
model (Eqs. 13) can be plotted in a graph to see how linear
the data are (Fig. 7). The r2 coefficients for b1 and b2 are
0.99 and 0.97, respectively. Finally, by back-transforming
this logratio values into the previous ones using ilr1, it is
possible to obtain the probabilities of each possible output
as a function of the overpressure.The failure criterion is
normally established as the pressure that causes collapse in
the 5 % of the cases. It is important to note that this cri-
terion does not mean that the containment building has a
5 % probability of collapse, but it ascertains that the
pressure for which the structure would collapse in the 5 %
of the cases. So that, the inner pressure of failure is
0.7335 MPa. Similar nuclear power plant containment
buildings, for instance, Vandello´s II (Spain), have been
analysed in detail in Stress Tests (Consejo de Seguridad
Fig. 7 Linear regression of the ilr transformed data. White points are
discarded and not used in the regression (Table 7)
Table 6 Probabilities of each
response for each overpressure
obtained from the simulation
Pressure xi (MPa) Serviceability p
ð1;jÞ
1 Breakdown p
ð1;jÞ
2 Collapse p
ð1;jÞ
3
Simulations C
0.40 0.9977145906 0.0022852621 0.0000001472 2384
0.45 0.9895539389 0.0104403679 0.0000056931 2257
0.50 0.9621359541 0.0378386536 0.0000253924 2250
0.55 0.9009824466 0.0987656199 0.0002519335 2188
0.60 0.7007071120 0.2983557187 0.0009371693 2240
0.65 0.3106313944 0.6825096513 0.0068589543 1780
0.70 0.0012657068 0.9791853629 0.0195489303 1794
0.75 0.0000000000 0.9666605764 0.0333394236 1477
0.80 0.0000000000 0.8539471646 0.1460528354 1852
0.85 0.0000000000 0.6888730503 0.3111269497 1375
0.90 0.0000000000 0.2135879397 0.7864120603 1345
0.95 0.0000000000 0.0099305357 0.9900694643 1191
1.00 0.0000000000 0.0000000000 1.0000000000 1165
23298
Last column is the number of simulations used
Table 7 Balance coordinates used in regression. Refer to Fig. 7 for
representation of the data
Pressure (MPa) b1 b2
0.40 8.9030 6.8235
0.45 6.7840 5.3133
0.50 5.6250 5.1666
0.55 4.2428 4.2224
0.60 3.0499 4.0752
0.65 1.2353 3.2528
0.70 – 2.7675
0.75 – 2.3809
0.80 – 1.2487
0.85 – 0.56205
0.90 – -0.92167
0.95 – –
1.00 – –
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Nuclear 2011), and the pressure of failure has been deter-
mined to be 0.8667 MPa. From the results of the regression
computed here (Fig. 8), it is possible to ascertain that this
pressure would have a probability of serviceability of
0.0012, 0.5874 of breakdown, and 0.4114 of collapse.
Moreover, the design pressure Vandello´s II containment
building is 0.3796 MPa (Consejo de Seguridad Nuclear
2011). Dividing the failure pressure obtained herein
(0.7335 MPa) by the design pressure, one obtains a safety
factor of 1.93. This is the most important result of the
analysis. It is interesting to point out that the large-break
loss of coolant accident (LOCA) has been considered tra-
ditionally in nuclear engineering as the worst-case scenario
in which the containment building can be involved (Cru-
sells-Girona 2011). The effect of such a severe accident is
typically taken as the design basis accident (DBA). A
large-break LOCA can produce an inner pressure of
0.4 MPa. From the results of the regression (Fig. 8), this
pressure would have a probability of serviceability of
0.9972, 0.0028 of breakdown, and a negligible 2:7047 
107 of collapse, confirming the proper design of the
building.
5 Conclusions
The ability to create a meaningful vulnerability model is a
fundamental piece in environmental risk assessment. Vul-
nerability is described as a set of probabilities of random
system responses under a given external action, whose
frequency is usually characterized as a hazard. By using a
definition of risk, associated with a given safety design, as
the expectation of the conditional cost with respect to that
design, the authors extract the following conclusions.
For a given random state of the system and a given
safety design, the cost is indeed well-defined, and is taken
as deterministic. First, one can derive an explicit form that
relates risk associated with a safety design as a function of
vulnerability, cost, and hazard. Then, one can focus on the
vulnerability part, which consists of predicting the proba-
bilities of the possible responses of the system conditioned
to a given external action and a given design, from the
sampling points. One then concludes that the inference of
these probabilities can be extracted from the available data
by a regression in the simplex, where the raw explanatory
variables are the design level and the value of the nominal
external actions. It is interesting to note that the framework
described herein is not applicable only to environmental
risk assessment, but it can also be applied to any risk of any
other nature, or a combination of them.
In Sect. 4, the authors turn their attention to the appli-
cation of this vulnerability framework. In particular, a finite
element model (FEM) is used to draw samples for a given
design of a nuclear power plant containment building. The
authors then conclude that the combination of finite ele-
ments, importance resampling, and regression in the sim-
plex allows the design process to count on robust
vulnerability models for environmental risk assessment of
civil works. Table 6 shows the results obtained and the
number of simulations computed. The vulnerability model
is obtained (Fig. 8) for the geometrical and constitutive
design described in Sect. 4. Remarkably enough, the design
used in this example is analogous to the Vandello´s II
containment building in Tarragona, Spain. In conclusion,
Fig. 8 Final result, regression
that shows the probability of
each possible state after an
overpressure event
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by applying standard measures in Nuclear Engineering,
inner pressure of failure of 0.7335 MPa and a safety factor
of 1.93 are obtained. This result is in accordance to the
results in a similar plant by the Monte Carlo approach in
Cervera et al. (1995): pressure of failure of 1.0301 MPa
and a safety factor of 2.78 are obtained. The main contri-
bution consists of a methodological description assessing
risk and then describing a robust framework to build vul-
nerability models. In particular, other studies (Cervera
et al. 1995), as well as regulatory procedures (U.S. Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 1984), only characterize a binary
state (collapse or service); here instead we study three in a
way that can be easily generalized.
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